(18) Emergence & Necessity (from Classical to Historical Thought)

Emergence and Necessity (From Classical to Historical Thought)

From the point of view of having entered the third millennium, and from an empirical point of view, we have seen enough history to point to the data for an easy confirmation of the fact that meta-narratives have emerged as a part of our ongoing narrative in a polemic of narratives. However, and as contradictory as it may seem, human knowledge is potentially emergent but, as potent, it need not do so. That is, such emergence is historical and existential. As such, again, it does not rest in first principles, logical necessity or impossibility, or self-evidence--for self-evidence means we have already understood a generally accepted starting place, and understood it well. Rather, such emergence is or is not a fact—and we verify facts by continually inspecting the evidence for it in the datum that is human history.

Thus, if viewed critically, empirical knowledge as an object of philosophical interest must also be viewed historically, rather than from a classicist or absolutist point of view. We will explore more about the notion of the absolute in our later chapters and as our argument unfolds; however again, from the empirical point of view, the “explosion” or emergence of knowledge is not a “logical necessity,” and we know from our now-long experience that movements in our knowledge can dry up, go off-track, or die—or be killed, at least for the moment. In fact, however, temporarily off-track or not, this explosion and emergence of knowledge happens to be the case up to and at this point in time--that is, the kind of knowledge that, when we do not have it, we initiate a search; and the kind of knowledge that, when we have it, we then speak and act by its terms. In this sense, there are no guarantees for stasis, on the one hand, or for further emergence of knowledge, on the other. “Given the current times, when the knowledge realm is exploding so rapidly, the only constant seems to be the procedures by which we process knowledge” (Ornstein & Hunkins, 2004, p. 237).

Further, though far from guaranteed, we have no reason to think that such emergence will not continue on its course; and, though we have no guarantee of continued good results, our method of consciousness, with its habit of self-correction, continues, in fact, to produce “cumulative and progressive results” (1972, p. 5). Further, transcendental method goes far in defining “the procedures by which we process knowledge.”

In practice, and by very practical considerations, human knowledge, in fact, has emerged, changed, been improved upon and corrected, been expressed in a myriad of ways, gotten lost, fallen away, and, sometimes, emerged again in different forms and in different expressions. Further, we still commonly say, “It is true that . . .” and we mean that we know something concretely real by making such statements. I trust I need not provide you with specific details for this evidence precisely because such details are so abundant, and so abundantly clear in every conversation we participate in.

Furthermore, we continue to search for more comprehensive ways to understand and to express what we have come to know (Kuhn, 1970). Again, the philosophical meta-narratives emerge. As such, meta-narratives are expressions of the same thrust that underpins what we mean by our knowledge as a concretem critical, and evidential affair. Like that knowledge, and from the point of view of self-appropriation, metanarratives can be understood as concrete developments on our way to knowledge, in our empirical, historical, and emergent human being, and as open to further critique and transformation in terms of evidential concerns as history proceeds.

General empirical method is not, then, an empty meta-narrative, though it may be portrayed as one if understood only from a classicist point of view, and though it implies several dimensions of a projected meta-analysis. Rather, the verifiable theory of the method of human consciousness is about the concrete thrust of our intention-quest “behind” all present knowledge, and is expressed in many studies as several “levels” (1972). In our present study, we will focus on that prior intention-quest that informs those levels and lay out the conditions for your own verification of it.

Further, transcendental method-as-theory marks a discovery of the order of human consciousness that, in fact, continuously opens up onto all past, present, and future meaning, onto all current knowledge, onto all feelings and images, corrections and self-corrections, onto all concepts and expressions and, further, onto all yet unknown and mysterious. Rather than being a floating meta-narrative or a logical necessity, general empirical method begins in you and turns out to be a qualified theory of a set of self-verifiable concrete facts—facts that some have already learned about, verified, and further appropriated as a self-identity; and facts that await others to so-understand and appropriate for themselves.

So our major theoretician, Bernard Lonergan, bids us to recognize the difference between, first, the data under consideration in developing a cognitional theory (our own and others’ actual operations) and, second, a theory of those operations. Further, he bids us to personally judge whether or not the theory, transcendental or general empirical method, is consistent with those heretofore experienced operations. Moreover, as a philosophical theory should, transcendental method accounts for how all scientists, philosophers, and persons of common sense actually approach any data and develop or “construct” theory, methods, meta-narratives and stories; how we go about deconstructing the same; and how knowledge, expressions, and conceptual frameworks become static, change, transform and emerge transformed again in real and concrete human history.

In other words, an adequate and verified cognitional theory will lead to an adequate theory of knowledge and, personally verified and appropriated, both stand to have a profound effect on how we approach and understand anything else--all being and reality—and in all fields of study. Speaking of the method of consciousness that produces all other methods, Lonergan states:


Where other methods aim at meeting the exigencies and exploiting the opportunities proper to particular fields, transcendental method is concerned with meeting the exigencies and exploiting the opportunities presented by the human mind itself. It is a concern that is both foundational and universally significant and relevant. (1972, p. 14)


I do not want you to merely believe me or Lonergan or the other writers who draw on and develop his work. And I am not claiming that such a theory is a meta-narrative and, as such, necessary or necessarily right. Rather, I want you to be open enough to go through the exercises here, or to take on the project of reading Lonergan’s work, to allow the work to challenge you at the core of your thinking, and to find out for yourself whether it rings true or not. I want you to be highly critical, to experiment, and to test the theory for yourself.

We will find the evidence for or against transcendental method not in logical necessity, or in believing a meta-narrative, but in the actual cognitional operations of all persons, and particularly of persons of common sense, of scientists, positivists and of post-modernist constructionists and de-constructionists in our most critical mode of thought.